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SELECTED DEVELOPMENTS IN CIVIL
PROCEDURE IN THE NINTH CIRCUIT
THE JURISDICTIONAL AMOUNT REQUIREMENT-
VALUATION FROM THE DEFENDANT'S PERSPECTIVE
I. INTRODUCTION
The jurisdictional amount requirement' is not mandated by the United
States Constitution.2 Instead, the Judiciary Act of 17891 provided that
plaintiffs must pass a monetary jurisdictional barrier4 in order to gain
access to the federal courts. By creating this barrier, Congress intended
to strengthen the concept that federal courts are courts of limited juris-
diction.5 However, Congress still recognized that the requisite sum
1. The jurisdictional amount requirement is currently set forth in title 28 of the United
States Code. Section 1331 provides in pertinent part:
(a) The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions wherein
the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $10,000, exclusive of interests
and costs, and arises under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States
except that no such sum or value shall be required in any such action brought against
the United States, any agency thereof, or any officer or employee thereof in his
official capacity.
28 U.S.C.A. § 1331(a) (West Supp. 1977).
Section 1332 provides in pertinent part: "(a) The'district courts shall have original
jurisdiction of all civil actions where the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value
of $10,000, exclusive of interests and costs, and is between-() citizens of different
States." 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(1) (1970).
2. U.S. CONST. art. III, § I states that "[the judicial Power of the United States, shall
be vested in one supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the- Congress may from
time to time ordain and establish." Section 2 of article III adds that "[t]he judicial Power
shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under this Constitution, the Laws of
the United States, and Treaties made, .... [and] to Controversies . . .between Citizens
of different States . . . ." Id. § 2.
3. Act of Sept. 24, 1789, ch. 20, § 11, 1 Stat. 78.
4. Over the years, Congress steadily increased the requisite amount. The Judiciary Act
of 1789 provided that all claims must exceed $500. Act of Sept. 24, 1789, ch. 20, § 11, 1
Stat. 78. In 1887, Congress raised the sum to $2,000. Act of March 3, 1887, ch. 373, § 1, 24
Stat. 552. In 1911, the amount was raised to $3,000. Act of March 3, 1911, ch. 231, § 24, 36
Stat. 1091. Congress increased the amount to $10,000 in 1958. Act of July 25, 1958, Pub. L.
No. 85-554, § 1, 72 Stat. 415 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1970)).
5. Lorraine Motors, Inc. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 166 F. Supp. 319, 321 (E.D.N.Y.
1958) ("[T]he purpose of making the amount in controversy. . . determinative of juris-
diction has always been to prevent the dockets of the federal courts from being over-
crowded with small cases .... "). See also Smith v. Sperling, 237 F.2d 317,321 (9th Cir.
1956), rev'd on othergrounds, 354 U.S. 91 (1957) ("The courts of the federal system are of
...limited jurisdiction .... "1).
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'should not be so high as to convert the Federal courts into courts of big
business . ... "6 Therefore, it is obvious that competing tensions exist:
the federal judiciary should not be cluttered with petty cases, but the
system should also not be so restricted as to become inaccessible to
plaintiffs with substantial claims.
The competing considerations are easily stated, but judicial attempts to
reconcile them yield inconsistent results, especially in suits where injunc-
tive relief is sought. It is easier to value claims for damages since the
court has before it a specific amount included in the plaintiff's complaint.
Unless it can be shown to a "legal certainty ' 7 that the plaintiff cannot
prove the damages he claims, the amount in controversy requirement is
satisfied. 8 However, where injunctive relief is requested, the plaintiff
often seeks to vindicate an intangible right which cannot be translated
into monetary terms. 9 It is also possible that a suit of little pecuniary
worth to the plaintiff may have substantial value to the defendant. 10
In order to alleviate the harsh results" which follow from a strict
6. S. REP. No. 1830, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. 4, reprinted in [1958] U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEws 3099, 3101. On the other hand, Congress realized that the requisite amount
should not be so small that the courts would "fritter away their time in the trial of petty
controversies." Id.
7. It is interesting to note that courts are somewhat inconsistent in applying the burden
of proof. The correct view is that once the plaintiff alleges the proper amount in
controversy, the burden is upon the defendant to prove to a legal certainty that the
plaintiff cannot prove damages in that amount. St. Paul Mercury Indem. Co. v. Red Cab
Co., 303 U.S. 283, 289 (1938). But some courts have denied a federal forum to plaintiffs
when plaintiffs could not demonstrate to a legal certainty that their claims met the
jurisdictional amount requirement. See, e.g., Zahn v. International Paper Co., 414 U.S.
291 (1973) (court maintained it must be convinced to legal certainty that the claims of
unnamed class members met the requisite amount).
8. See I MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE 0.91[1], at 839 (2d ed. 1977); Dobie, Juris-
dictional Amount in the United States District Court, 38 HARV. L. REV. 733, 734 (1925).
See also text accompanying note 17 infra.
9. See, e.g., Spock v. David, 469 F.2d 1047 (3d Cir. 1972) (rights of freedom of speech
and freedom of assembly necessarily satisfy jurisdictional amount requirement); Giancana
v. Johnson, 335 F.2d 366 (7th Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 1001 (1965) (right to be free
from surveillance by FBI held incapable of monetary valuation). But cf. Bivens v. Six
Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971) (damage claim for violation of fourth
amendment rights justiciable under § 1331).
10. See, e.g., State Chartered Banks v. Peoples Nat'l Bank, 291 F. Supp. 180 (W.D.
Wash. 1966). See notes 36-40 infra and accompanying text.
1I. The harshest possible result is to deny the plaintiff a federal forum. See, e.g.,
Giancana v. Johnson, 335 F.2d 366 (7th Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 1001 (1965);
Senate Select Comm. on Presidential Campaign Activities v. Nixon, 366 F. Supp. 51
(D.D.C. 1973). Yet Congress realized that suits involving violations of constitutional
rights are those most deserving of being heard in federal court. H.R. REP. No. 1656, 94th
Cong., 2d Sess. 15, reprinted in [1976] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 6121, 6135.
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application of the traditional method12 of valuing claims, some federal
courts have shown an increasing willingness to value the controversy
from the defendant's perspective. The Ninth Circuit, although it has
addressed the issue in a variety of contexts, has not clearly indicated
those situations where it will follow the defendant's perspective rule.
Inherent in the court's efforts to formulate a clear policy is the recogni-
tion that the jurisdictional amount requirement in sections 133113 and
133214 is not always an accurate measure of the "substantiality" of a
claim for injunctive relief. 15
II. LAWSUITS INVOLVING A SOLE PLAINTIFF
A. Plaintiff's Viewpoint vs. Defendant's Perspective
The matter in controversy has traditionally been valued from the
plaintiff's point of view. 16 This method of valuation, known as the
"plaintiff viewpoint rule,' 1 7 is treated by some courts as an inflexible
doctrine."8 However, there is substantial authority 9 to support an oppos-
ing view-that the claim may be valued from the perspective of the
defendant.20 It is clear that at the present time there is no generally
12. See notes 16-17 infra and accompanying text.
13. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1331 (West Supp. 1977). See note I supra.
14. 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (1970). See note I supra.
15. It is important to note the change in Congress' definition of "substantial claims." In
1958, such claims were based almost entirely on their pecuniary worth. S. REP. No. 1830,
85th Cong., 2d Sess. 4, reprinted in [1958] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 3099, 3101. In
1976, Congress admitted that "[t]he factors relevant to the question whether a Federal
court should be available to a litigant seeking protection of a Federal right have little, if
any, correlation with the minimum jurisdictional amount." H.R. REP. No. 1656, 94th
Cong., 2d Sess. 15, reprinted in [1976] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 6121, 6135. A
recurrent theme in this note is that it is incorrect to automatically equate the "substantiali-
ty" of a suit with its monetary value.
16. See, e.g., Glenwood Light & Water Co. v. Mutual Light, Heat & Power Co., 239
U.S. 121, 125 (1915) ("[Ihe jurisdictional amount is to be tested by the value of the object
to be gained by complainant.").
17. Dobie, Jurisdictional Amount in the United States District Court, 38 HARV. L. REV.
733, 736 (1925).
18. See, e.g., Mas v. Perry, 489 F.2d 1396, 1400 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 842
(1974) ("[T]he amount in controversy is determined by the amount claimed by the plaintiff
in good faith."); Massachusetts State Pharmaceutical Ass'n v. Federal Prescription Serv.,
Inc., 431 F.2d 130, 132 n.1 (8th Cir. 1970) ("[W]e are of the view that the 'plaintiff's
viewpoint rule' is the only valid rule.").
19. E.g., Hatridge v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 415 F.2d 809 (8th Cir. 1969); Berman v.
Narragansett Racing Ass'n, 414 F.2d 311 (Ist Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1037
(1970); Government Employees Ins. Co. v. Lally, 327 F.2d 568 (4th Cir. 1964); Ridder
Bros. v. Blethen, 142 F.2d 395 (9th Cir. 1944).
20. Often a court will refer to the "value of the thing to be accomplished," or the
"value of the object," rather than "defendant's perspective." The effect of all such
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accepted means of valuing a claim. 2 There is disagreement not only
between circuits,22 but within circuits as well. For example, courts in the
Ninth Circuit have used both methods.
23
There is normally little difficulty in applying the plaintiff viewpoint
method where plaintiff's claim equals the potential loss to the defend-
ant.24 However, this method becomes considerably more difficult to
apply in suits seeking injunctive relief, when the value of the claim to the
respective parties differs,25 or when the right plaintiff seeks to protect is
incapable of monetary valuation. 26 Still, many courts continue to follow
the plaintiff viewpoint rule, even though the action is barred from federal
court as a result. 27
"Plaintiff viewpoint" valuation requires the complainant, as the party
exercising the court's jurisdiction,28 to plead the requisite amount in
language, however, is to value the claim from the viewpoint of the defendant. See, e.g.,
Mississippi & Mo. R.R. v. Ward, 67 U.S. 485, 492 (1862); Ridder Bros. v. Blethen, 142
F.2d 395, 399 (9th Cir. 1944).
21. Compare Mas v. Perry, 489 F.2d 1396, 1400 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 842
(1974) ("It is well settled that the amount in controversy is determined by the amount
claimed by the plaintiff .... ") with Senate Select Comm. on Presidential Campaign
Activities v. Nixon, 366 F. Supp. 51, 60 (D.D.C. 1973) ("[Ilt is well settled that in
determining the amount-in-controversy, reference to either party's situation is appropri-
ate.").
22. Compare note 27 infra and accompanying text with note 34 infra. See also note 28
infra.
23. Compare Riggins v. Riggins, 415 F.2d 1259 (9th Cir. 1969) and Chavez-Salido v.
Cabell, 427 F. Supp. 158 (C.D. Cal. 1977) (appeal pending) with Ridder Bros. v. Blethen,
142 F.2d 395 (9th Cir. 1944) and Petterson v. Resor, 331 F. Supp. 1302 (D. Ore. 1971).
24. For instance, if the plaintiff suffers injuries in an automobile accident and in good
faith sues defendant for $50,000, defendant stands to lose exactly what plaintiff stands to
gain-50,000.
25. See Government Employees Ins. Co. v. Lally, 327 F.2d 568 (4th Cir. 1964). In
Lally, plaintiff insurance company sued for a declaratory judgment, seeking to limit its
liability under the defendant's policy to $10,000. Potential liability under the policy was
$30,000. The plaintiff's claim was technically worth an even $10,000 and thus did not meet
the jurisdictional amount requirement (the statute provides that the claim must exceed
$10,000). Use of the defendant's perspective rule led to a different result, since defendant
contended that plaintiff was liable for the full value of the policy, $30,000.
26. See, e.g., Tatum v. Laird, 444 F.2d 947 (D.C. Cir. 1971), rev'd on other grounds,
408 U.S. 1 (1972) (plaintiffs challenged surveillance of lawful civilian political activity by
United States Army).
27. See, e.g., Jackson v. American Bar Ass'n, 538 F.2d 829 (9th Cir. 1976); Kheel v.
Port Auth., 457 F.2d 46 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 983 (1972).
28. There is a third method of valuing claims used by a small minority of courts, which
permits valuation of the claim with reference to which party (plaintiff or defendant) seeks
to exercise federal jurisdiction. For example, where the defendant seeks to remove a case
from state to federal court, the value of the claim will be assessed from the defendant's
perspective. One court decided that
when what a plaintiff stands to gain and what a defendant stands to lose are unequal,
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controversy.29 Courts adhering to this procedure reason that
[s]ince the question of original jurisdiction is contingent on the
complaint of the plaintiff, setting out his cause of action, it would
seem to follow that the jurisdictional fact of the value of that cause
of action or the amount in controversy would be determined from
the plaintiff's viewpoint. Certainly such a standard normally leads to
a greater certainty and simplicity than would ensue should the de-
fendant's viewpoint be injected into the determination.
3 0
Courts subscribing to this view overlook the fact that, although certainty
and simplicity are desirable goals, they should not be pursued at the risk
of barring substantial claims3 from federal court.
The plaintiff viewpoint rule is less easily applied when the com-
plainant's claim is difficult to value, or when defendant seeks to exercise
the jurisdiction of the court through the process of removal.12 A plaintiff
seeking an injunction may find it difficult to value his claim in terms of
dollars and cents.33 To circumvent this problem, some courts34 have
and where federal jurisdiction is invoked by the party standing to gain or lose more
than his adversary the greater gain or the greater loss should be applied as the criteria
of jurisdictional amount.
Inman v. Milwhite Co., 261 F. Supp. 703, 708 (E.D. Ark. 1966), aff'd, 402 F.2d 122 (8th
Cir. 1968). See also Family Motor Inn, Inc. v. L-K Enterprises Div. Consol. Foods Corp.,
369 F. Supp. 766 (E.D. Ky. 1973).
29. St. Paul Mercury Indem. Co. v. Red Cab Co., 303 U.S. 283, 288 (1938). Once the
plaintiff pleads the proper amount, the burden falls on the defendant to attack the court's
jurisdiction. See note 7 supra.
30. 1 MOORE's FEDERAL PRACTICE 0.91[l], at 845 (2d ed. 1977).
31. See note 15 supra.
32. 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a) (1970) provides:
[A]ny civil action brought in a State court of which the district courts of the United
States have original jurisdiction, may be removed by the defendant or the defendants,
to the district court of the United States for the district and division embracing the
place where such action is pending.
33. See, e.g., Committee for GI Rights v. Callaway, 518 F.2d 466 (D.C. Cir. 1975)
(plaintiff, soldier in Europe, sought to have Army's drug rehabilitation program declared
unconstitutional); Petterson v. Resor, 331 F. Supp. 1302 (D. Ore. 1971) (plaintiffs sought
to enjoin Army Corps of Engineers from expanding local airport, fearing damage to
property in form of noise and congestion).
34. In State Chartered Banks v. Peoples Nat'l Bank, 291 F. Supp. 180 (W.D. Wash.
1966), the court acknowledged that although the defendant's perspective rule was only
accepted by a minority of courts, "this holding [allowing consideration of defendant's
interests] may be gaining acceptance in other jurisdictions as well as our own circuit." Id.
at 186. At least four circuits currently accept this method. See Hatridge v. Aetna Cas. &
Sur. Co., 415 F.2d 809 (8th Cir. 1969); Berman v. Narragansett Racing Ass'n, 414 F.2d 311
(lst Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1037 (1970); Government Employees Ins. Co. v.
Lally, 327 F.2d 568 (4th Cir. 1964); Ronzio v. Denver & R.G.W.R.R., 116 F.2d 604, (10th
Cir. 1940). The Ninth Circuit appears to accept the defendant's perspective rule under
some circumstances. See Ridder Bros. v. Blethen, 142 F.2d 395 (9th Cir. 1944). The
Ridder Bros. holding was limited by the Ninth Circuit's decisions in Snow v. Ford Motor
Co., 561 F.2d 787 (9th Cir. 1977) and Jackson v. American Bar Ass'n, 538 F.2d 829 (9th
Cir. 1976).
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taken the attitude that "[i]n determining the matter in controversy, we
may look to the object sought to be accomplished by the plaintiff's
complaint; the test for determining the amount in controversy is the
pecuniary result to either party which the judgment would directly pro-
duce."
35
In State Chartered Banks v. Peoples National Bank,36 plaintiffs
sought an injunction and a declaration that construction of a branch bank
by the defendant was unlawful. The defendant claimed that the new
facility would simply be an extension of the extant bank, and thus not
subject to the authority of the state comptroller and state statutes. Since
plaintiffs realized in evaluating the impact of a branch bank on their
businesses that their damages "must be prospective and not easy of
evaluation,', 37 they made no attempt to use the plaintiff viewpoint rule.
Instead, they requested that the court value the action from the perspec-
tive of the defendant. The value of the lawsuit from the defendant's
perspective satisfied the statutory requirement, since 'defendant would
sustain over $50,000 actual damages in contract cancellations. The court
held that it was proper to value the claim from the defendant's viewpoint.
The court noted in State Chartered Banks that the defendants could
have brought an action to declare construction of the branch lawful. In
that event, the court would have been able to conclude that the claim
exceeded the jurisdictional amount requirement under a traditional analy-
sis. The court saw no reason to dismiss the plaintiffs' suit simply because
they had gone forward and filed the action. The right to operate a branch
bank was in dispute, regardless of who brought the suit.
38
The controversy in State Chartered Banks was not a "trivial" one.
39
Yet, had the court applied the plaintiff viewpoint rule, plaintiffs probably
could not have filed the lawsuit in a federal forum4n Those courts
following the defendant's perspective rule recognize that suits for injunc-
tive relief are not "petty" just because the relief sought is difficult to
value in monetary terms. Therefore, instead of rigidly applying the
jurisdictional amount requirement, they look to the rights involved to
evaluate the substantiality of the claim. Considering that the purpose of
the amount in controversy requirement is to prevent federal courts from
35. Ronzio v. Denver & R.G.W.R.R., 116 F.2d 604, 606 (10th Cir. 1940).
36. 291 F. Supp. 180 (W.D. Wash. 1966).
37. Id. at 186.
38. Id. at 187.
39. This is clearly the case since defendant stood to lose $50,000 in contract cancella-
tions and the right to operate its facility.
40. 291 F. Supp. at 186.
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"fritter[ing] away their time in the trial of petty controversies," 41 these
courts refuse to accept the "price tag" of a suit as determinative of its
worth. When the test of substantiality is met by valuing the action from
defendant's perspective, it makes little sense to keep the suit out of court.
It is unclear which of the aforementioned methods has been adopted by
the Ninth Circuit. Some courts have held that the plaintiff viewpoint rule
is the proper method of valuing the amount in controversy.4 2 Generally,
however, courts in the Ninth Circuit are willing to look to the defendant's
interests .43
The Ninth Circuit first accepted the defendant's perspective method in
1944;44 since then several district courts have used it.45 Professor Wright
indicates that no proponent of the plaintiff viewpoint rule has "pointed to
any Supreme Court decision rejecting jurisdiction where the juris-
dictional amount was satisfied from the defendant's viewpoint, but not
from the plaintiff's. Only such a case can conclusively establish the
'plaintiff viewpoint rule.' "6 Until the Ninth Circuit adopts one rule or
the other,4 7 district courts apparently may use their discretion in deciding
which rule to follow.
41. S. REP. No. 1830, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. 4, reprinted in [1958] U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWS 3099, 3101.
42. See, e.g., Riggins v. Riggins, 415 F.2d 1259 (9th Cir. 1969); Chavez-Salido v. Cabell,
427 F. Supp. 158 (C.D. Cal. 1977) (appeal pending). In neither of these cases, however,
was it necessary to resort to the defendant's perspective rule to establish jurisdiction.
Jurisdiction was established under the traditional "plaintiff viewpoint" method.
43. See, e.g., Ridder Bros. v. Blethen, 142 F.2d 395 (9th Cir. 1944); Petterson v. Resor,
331 F. Supp. 1302 (D. Ore. 1971); State Chartered Banks v. Peoples Nat' Bank, 291 F.
Supp. 180 (W.D. Wash. 1966).
44. Ridder Bros. v. Blethen, 142 F.2d 395 (9th Cir. 1944).
45. See, e.g., State Chartered Banks v. Peoples Nat'l Bank, 291 F. Supp. 180 (W.D.
Wash. 1966). See note 43 supra and accompanying text.
46. C. WRIGHT, LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS 134-35 (3d ed. 1976).
47. In Snow v. Ford Motor Co., 561 F.2d 787, 790 n.5 (9th Cir. 1977), the court said that
"to the extent that Ridder Bros., Inc. v. Blethen . . .is inconsistent with Snyder, it must
be considered to have been superseded." Snyder v. Harris, 394 U.S. 332 (1969) held that
plaintiffs in a class action suit may not aggregate their claims to meet the jurisdictional
amount requirement. Instead, each plaintiff must have a claim exceeding $10,000. See
notes 76-103 infra and accompanying text. In Snow, plaintiffs attempted to apply the
defendant's perspective rule to circumvent Snyder's non-aggregation doctrine. The court
held that in this situation, use of the defendant's perspective rule was simply a means of
avoiding Snyder and was therefore impermissible. It should be noted that the Ninth
Circuit relied principally on Massachusetts State Pharmaceutical Ass'n v. Federal Pre-
scription Serv., Inc., 431 F.2d 130, 132 n.1 (8th Cir. 1970) which went further in its
analysis: "In light of Snyder v. Harris . ..we are of the view that the 'plaintiff's
viewpoint' rule is the only valid rule." It is possible the Ninth Circuit will continue to
follow the lead of the Eighth Circuit and eventually disregard the defendant's perspective
rule altogether. However, since the court could have done so in Snow had it been so
inclined, it seems more likely that the Ninth Circuit will not go as far as the Eighth Circuit
has gone.
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B. Valuing Constitutional Claims
1. Valuation from the Defendant's Perspective
Constitutional rights and intangible interests are often incapable of
being valued in monetary terms. It is virtually impossible48 to assess the
value of one's right to walk through city streets unharassed by the
police, 49 or the right to be free from surveillance by the FBI.50 Since rigid
application of the plaintiff viewpoint rule would result in denying a
federal forum to plaintiffs in these cases, it is important to consider
whether the defendant's perspective rule may be invoked to confer
jurisdiction.
For the most part, federal courts still hold that the jurisdictional
amount requirement must be met when a case seeks injunctive relief to
rectify the infringement of a constitutional right.5' It is recognized that
"[h]owever unsavory the 'price tag' requirement of § 1331 . . .it is still
the task of the district courts to consider the rights sought to be protected
and determine whether, in the circumstances of the case, the value of
their vindication exceeds $10,000."52 Whereas some courts require a
strict interpretation of the jurisdiction amount requirement," others apply
the requirement loosely, either by accepting a bare allegation of more
48. Although it may be "impossible," a finding that the amount in controversy exceeds
$10,000 is necessary no matter how difficult the valuation may be. King v. Morton, 520
F.2d 1140, 1145 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
49. Gomez v. Wilson, 477 F.2d 411 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
50. Giancana v. Johnson, 335 F.2d 366 (7th Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 1001
(1965).
51. See Senate Select Comm. on Presidential Campaign Activities v. Nixon, 366 F.
Supp. 51, 59 (D.D.C. 1973) ("The satisfaction of a minimum amount-in-controversy is not
a technicality; it is a requirement imposed by Congress which the courts may not dispense
with at their pleasure.").
Cortright v. Resor, 325 F. Supp. 797 (E.D.N.Y.), rev'd on other grounds, 447 F.2d 245
(2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 965 (1972), is an exception to the general rule. The
court was adamant in its refusal to dismiss the claim for failure to meet the jurisdictional
amount requirement:
A monetary price can hardly be placed on the rights guaranteed by the First Amend-
ment. To say that these priceless rights so many have fought and died to protect are
worth nothing is to insult the basic principles upon which this nation was founded and
which still give it its unique vitality. Free speech is almost by definition, worth more
than $10,000. ...
Id. at 810.
52. CCCO-Western Region v. Fellows, 359 F. Supp. 644, 647 (N.D. Cal. 1972).
53. In Shimabuku v. Britton, 357 F. Supp. 825 (D. Kan. 1973), aff'd, 503 F.2d 38 (10th
Cir. 1974), the court stated: "Jurisdiction under § 1331 cannot be founded on a right
secured by the Constitution unless that right 'has a known and certain value, which can be
proved or calculated, in the ordinary mode of a business transaction.' "Id. at 826 (quoting
Barry v. Mercein, 46 U.S. 103, 120 (1847)).
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than $10,000 by the plaintiff,54 or by valuing the claim from the defend-
ant's perspective. 5
The confusion among courts regarding the valuation of constitutional
claims is illustrated by two cases, Goldsmith v. Sutherland56 and CCCO-
Western Region v. Fellows .5 Both cases were decided in the early 1970s
and involved protesters entering military bases to distribute anti-war
leaflets. In both cases plaintiffs were removed from the bases; subse-
quently, they received "bar letters" informing them that if they returned
to the bases, they would be prosecuted under 18 U.S.C. section 1382.58
In Fellows, plaintiffs sought a declaration that "bar letters" and section
1382 were unconstitutional. In Goldsmith, plaintiff sued to enjoin the
defendant from enforcing the exclusion order.
The court in Fellows found that the valuation process, no matter how
distasteful to the court, was still a necessary element of subject matter
jurisdiction. However, the court proceeded to find that the amount in
controversy requirement had been met because the rights involved had
"traditionally been regarded as fundamental." 5 9 Therefore, the court
found "that 'the allegation of jurisdiction based upon § 1331 ought not to
be subject to denial.' ," In effect, the court did not attempt to value the
claim in monetary terms at all. It was simply acknowledged that such
rights are so important that they necessarily must exceed any juris-
dictional amount requirement imposed by Congress.
The court in Goldsmith took the opposite view. Acknowledging the
difficulty of valuing a constitutional right where injunctive relief is
sought, the court held that "[t]he rule pertaining to the specified dollar
sum requirement is that 'the matter in dispute must be money, or some
right, the value of which, in money, can be calculated and ascer-
tained.' "61 The effect of this attitude is to allow into federal court only
those suits which have a monetary basis. Any claim not capable of being
54. See, e.g., Gomez v. Wilson, 477 F.2d 411 (D.C. Cir. 1973); Spock v. David, 469
F.2d 1047 (3d Cir. 1972).
55. See, e.g., Committee for GI Rights v. Callaway, 518 F.2d 466 (D.C. Cir. 1975);
Tatum v. Laird, 444 F.2d 947 (D.C. Cir. 1971), rev'don othergrounds, 408 U.S. 1 (1972).
56. 426 F.2d 1395 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 960 (1970).
57. 359 F. Supp. 644 (N.D. Cal. 1972).
58. 18 U.S.C. § 1382 (1970) provides in pertinent part:
Whoever reenters or is found within any. . . reservation, post, fort, arsenal, yard,
station, or installation, after having been removed therefrom or ordered not to reenter
by any officer or in person in command or charge thereof-
Shall be fined not more than $500 or imprisoned not more than six months, or both.
59. 359 F. Supp. at 648.
60. Id. (quoting Cortright v. Resor, 325 F. Supp. 797, 810 (E.D.N.Y.), rev'd on other
grounds, 447 F.2d 245 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 965 (1972)).
61. 426 F.2d at 1397 (quoting Barry v. Mercein, 46 U.S. 103, 120 (1847)).
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valued in terms of dollars and cents is equated with a "petty controver-
sy''62 and is denied a federal forum.
Fellows and Goldsmith exemplify differing viewpoints exhibited by
federal courts.63 District courts in the Ninth Circuit apply both views,
without resolution by the appellate court. 64 The Ninth Circuit did, how-
ever, recently consider a case requiring the valuation of rights which
were "intangible, speculative, and [which lacked] the capability of being
translated into monetary values." ' 65 The court found that unless such
rights could be measured in pecuniary terms, the jurisdictional amount
requirement was not met. However, the court believed that the rights
involved therein were not legitimate constitutional rights. The distinction
is important, in light of the split of authority just discussed. The cas6s
represented by Fellows clearly treat bonafide constitutional rights as a
special subcategory of injunctive suits; these cases are treated more
liberally than non-constitutional cases.66 Until the Ninth Circuit decides a
case involving the valuation of fundamental rights in an action for
injunctive relief, the validity of treating this "subcategory" differently
may be questioned.
2. The Effect of the 1976 Amendment to Section 1331
The issue of valuing constitutional rights, although still qualitatively
62. See note 6 supra and accompanying text.
63. Cases supporting the Fellows rationale include: Gomez v. Wilson, 477 F.2d 411
(D.C. Cir. 1973); Spock v. David, 469 F.2d 1047 (3d Cir. 1972); Tatum v. Laird, 444 F.2d
947 (D.C. Cir. 1971), rev'd on other grounds, 408 U.S. 1 (1972); Fifth Ave. Peace Parade
Comm. v. Hoover, 327 F. Supp. 238 (S.D.N.Y. 1971); Cortright v. Resor, 325 F. Supp.
797 (E.D.N.Y.), rev'don othergrounds, 447 F.2d 245 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S.
965 (1972). The following cases support Goldsmith: Giancana v. Johnson, 335 F.2d 366
(7th Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 1001 (1965); Chavez-Salido v. Cabell, 427 F. Supp.
158 (C.D. Cal. 1977) (appeal pending); Senate Select Comm. on Presidential Campaign
Activities v. Nixon, 366 F. Supp. 51 (D.D.C. 1973); Shimabuku v. Britton, 357 F. Supp.
825 (D. Kan. 1973); Yahr v. Resor, 339 F. Supp. 964 (E.D.N.C. 1972).
64. In Chavez-Salido v. Cabell, 427 F. Supp. 158 (C.D. Cal. 1977) (appeal pending), the
court discussed the split of authority and held: "In the absence of any decision on the
point from our Circuit we decline to follow the cases . . . which find the amount in
controversy invariably present because constitutional rights are not capable of valuation
in monetary terms." Id. at 166-67 n.18.
65. Jackson v. American Bar Ass'n, 538 F.2d 829, 831 (9th Cir. 1976). For a full
discussion of this case, see notes 122-26 infra and accompanying text.
66. See Committee for GI Rights v. Callaway, 518 F.2d 466, 473 n.19 (D.C. Cir. 1975)
("[C]ases of this nature which raise substantial constitutional questions lend support to
the position that the jurisdictional amount requirement should not be applied to defeat
federal jurisdiction when fundamental constitutional rights of intangible value are in-
volved."); Spock v. David, 469 F.2d 1047, 1052 (3d Cir. 1972) ("There is no reason to lay
down a rule of law that the rights of free speech and free assembly present nonjusticiable
problems of valuation.").
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important, has become less urgent in light of the 1976 amendment to
section 1331.67 By removing the jurisdictional amount requirement in
suits against federal officers, Congress effectively closed "an unfortu-
nate gap in the statutory jurisdiction of the federal courts."68 Over the
years, Congress had passed so many exceptions to section 133169 that the
House Judiciary Committee was led to state: "This category [of suits
against federal officers] provides the only significant instance in which
the jurisdictional amount requirement of 28 U.S.C. section 1331 is an
effective limitation. "70
Certainly the application of the monetary amount requirement was a
major barrier to jurisdiction in these suits. It was difficult to rationalize
the vesting of federal jurisdiction in actions against a state officer 7'
accused of violating a plaintiff's constitutional rights, while denying
jurisdiction in the identical suit against a federal officer because the
claim could not meet the requisite dollar value. However, the fact that
this gap has been closed by Congress does not entirely eliminate the need
to value constitutional rights. Chavez-Salido v. Cabel172 illustrates that
the problem still exists. In Cabell, three resident aliens challenged the
constitutionality of a state law which required employees of state, county
and local governments to be United States citizens. Defendant Los
Angeles County contended that the plaintiffs were unable to establish the
requisite jurisdictional amount. The court found that under recent Ninth
Circuit authority,73 "political subdivisions of states may be sued for both
damages and equitable relief for constitutional violations, with juris-
67. 28 U.S.C. § 1331 as amended in 1976 by Pub. L. No. 94-574, § 2, 90 Stat. 2721. Prior
to 1976, § 1331 read as follows: "The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all
civil actions wherein the matter in the controversy exceeds the sum or value of $10,000,
exclusive of interests or costs, and arises under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the
United States."
The 1976 amendment added this phrase: "except that no such sum or value shall be
required in any such action brought against the United States, any agency thereof, or any
officer or employee thereof in his official capacity." 28 U.S.C.A. § 1331(a) (West Supp.
1977).
68. Wolff v. Selective Serv. Local Bd. No. 16, 372 F.2d 817, 826 (2d Cir. 1967).
69. For a list of these exceptions, see H.R. REP. No. 1656, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 14,
reprinted in [1976] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 6121, 6134. The most important
exception is embodied in 28 U.S.C. § 1343 (1970 & Supp. V 1975). Section 1343 grants
federal courts jurisdiction over civil rights cases filed against state officers and private
persons, without regard to jurisdictional amount.
70. H.R. REP. No. 1656, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 15-16, reprinted in [1976] U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 6121, 6136.
71. Jurisdiction without regard to amount in controversy is granted by 28 U.S.C. § 1343
(1970 & Supp. V 1975). See note 69 supra.
72. 427 F. Supp. 158 (D.C. Cal. 1977) (appeal pending).
73. Gray v. Union County Intermediate Educ. Dep't, 520 F.2d 803 (9th Cir. 1975).
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diction being provided by 1331(a)." 74 It is apparent that although the
majority of cases involving constitutional violations have been removed
from the scope of section 1331, some of these cases will still arise in
federal courts.
III. CLASS ACTIONS
A. Doctrine of Aggregation
Special problems arise in valuing the matter in controversy when the
plaintiff has filed a class action. 75 Traditionally, courts have held that
plaintiffs in a class action may not aggregate their claims in order to meet
the jurisdictional amount requirement. 76 Instead, the value of each plain-
tiff's claim must exceed $10,000. The only exception to this rule is a suit
where "several plaintiffs unite to enforce a single title or right, in which
they have a common and undivided interest."77 q
Although the aggregation doctrine has stood without alteration for over
a century, many commentators78 hoped that the 1966 amendments to the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure would effect some change. There was a
74. 427 F. Supp. at 166 (emphasis added). "Political subdivisions" include munici-
palities, school boards and counties. However, the court said in dictum that jurisdiction
might have been established under § 1343(4) of title 28 as well, since the court found valid
claims under both the 14th amendment and 28 U.S.C. § 1981 (1970):
1343(4) is not broad enough to cover a charge of direct violation of the 14th Amend-
ment since the section is limited to civil actions arising "under any Act of Congress."
But since we hold that the County is amenable to suit in a § 1981 action, § 1343 would
give us jurisdiction and without respect to amount in controversy.
427 U.S. at 167 n.19. Conversely, had the court found only a constitutional violation,
plaintiffs would have had no choice but to satisfy the jurisdictional amount requirement of
§ 1331.
75. Since nearly all of the significant cases in the area of aggregation concern class
actions, this section will refer only to class suits. However, the discussion applies with
equal force to any lawsuit involving multiple claimants. The language of Zahn v. Interna-
tional Paper Co., 414 U.S. 291 (1973) makes this clear: "[M]ultiple plaintiffs with separate
and distinct claims must each satisfy the jurisdictional amount requirement for suit in the
federal courts." Id. at 294. A class action is only one type of suit involving multiple
claimants.
76. The doctrine of aggregation was first considered in Oliver v. Alexander, 31 U.S. 143
(1832). The Supreme Court has not altered its rejection of the doctrine since that time. For
a discussion of the history of this rule, see Coiner, Class Actions: Aggregation of Claims
for Federal Jurisdiction, 4 MEM. ST. U.L. REV. 427 (1974).
77. Troy Bank v. G.A. Whitehead & Co., 222 U.S. 39, 40-41 (1911).
78. See Coiner, Class Actions: Aggregation of Claims for Federal Jurisdiction, 4 MEM.
ST. U.L. REV. 427, 429 (1974); Goldberg, The Influence of Procedural Rules on Federal
Jurisdiction, 28 STAN. L. REV. 395, 405 (1976); Note, Civil Procedure-Class Actions-
Closing the Doors to the Federal Courts, 39 Mo. L. REV. 447, 448-49 (1974).
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widespread belief that with liberalized guidelines for class actions , 79 the
Court would allow aggregation in class action litigation. Instead, in
Snyder v. Harris,"0 the Court held that the old test still applies: unless
plaintiffs sue to protect a "common and undivided interest" 8 they may
not aggregate their claims to meet the jurisdictional amount requirement.
In Snyder plaintiffs were a group of 4,000 shareholders. They sued to
have the proceeds of a sale of stock by the company's directors dis-
tributed among the shareholders. Snyder's individual claim was for
$8,700, but the plaintiffs' aggregated claims exceeded $1,200,000. The
Court refused to allow aggregation for three reasons. First, the Court
maintained that the doctrine of aggregation did not develop from the
categorical definitions of former rule 23, but from an historical interpre-
tation of "matter in controversy." 8 2 Therefore, any change in the rule
should have no effect on the limits of aggregation. Second, the Court
held that to allow aggregation under the amended rule 23 would violate
the prohibition of rule 82, that "[tihese rules shall not be construed to
extend or limit the jurisdiction of the United States district courts. '"83
Third, the Court concluded that Congress had implicitly considered the
judicial doctrine of aggregation when it raised the jurisdictional amount
requirement in 1958. 4 Had Congress wanted to change this doctrine (or
its application), it would have done so explicitly. 5 The Court concluded:
There is no compelling reason for this Court to overturn a settled
interpretation of an important congressional statute in order to add
79. Prior to 1966, rule 23 categorized class actions as "true," "hybrid," or "spurious."
Aggregation of claims was allowed only in "true" class actions, since by definition such
suits involved "common and undivided rights." These categories proved to be too rigid
and confusing for consistent application by the courts, and they were therefore replaced
by the more "functional approach" of new rule 23. For a discussion of the history of the
amendment to rule 23 and its effect on aggregation, see Advisory Committee's Note,
Proposed Rules of Civil Procedure, 39 F.R.D. 69, 98 (1966). See also Snyder v. Harris, 394
U.S. 332, 335-40 (1969); Goldberg, The Influence of Procedural Rules on Federal Juris-
diction, 28 STAN. L. REv. 395, 400-02 (1976).
80. 394 U.S. 332, 341 (1969).
81. Id. at 335. Professor Wright has severely criticized the continued use of this test:
Except in property law contexts, such terms as "common" and "several" are poor
words for a test of jurisdiction-or anything else-since they "have little or no clear
and ascertainable meaning. . . . [Tihe Court said [in Snyder] that "lower courts have
developed largely workable standards for determining when claims are joint and
common, and therefore entitled to be aggregated, and when they are separate and
distinct and therefore not aggregable." It would have been helpful if the Court had
indicated what these standards are or where they are to be found.
C. WRIGHT, LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS 139-40 (3d ed. 1976) (quoting Snyder v. Harris, 394
U.S. at 341).
82. 394 U.S. at 336.
83. Id. at 337.
84. See note 4 supra.
85. 394 U.S. at 339.
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to the burdens of an already overloaded federal court system ....
If there is a present need to expand the jurisdiction of [the district]
courts, we cannot overlook the fact that the Constitution specifically
vests that power in Congress, not in the courts.
86
For these reasons the ban on aggregation in federal courts was continued
without alteration.
The Court provided additional limitations on aggregation in Zahn v.
International Paper Co. 87 In Zahn, the class action was brought by
owners of lakefront property, seeking damages from defendant for pol-
luting the lake. The named plaintiffs' claims were valued in excess of
$10,000. However, there was no showing that the claim of each un-
named class member exceeded that amount. The Court held that "[e]ach
plaintiff in a Rule 23(b)(3) class action must satisfy the jurisdictional
amount, and any plaintiff who does not may be dismissed from the
case-'one plaintiff may not ride in on another's coattails.' "88
The Court has, therefore, clearly indicated that aggregation in a rule
23(b)(3) 89 class action is impermissible. 90 The effect of Snyder and Zahn
is to preclude plaintiffs from bringing a class action in federal court
unless it falls into one of three exceptions: (1) where it can be shown to a
"legal certainty" 91 that each member of the class has incurred damages
in excess of $10,000; (2) where plaintiffs can invoke jurisdiction under a
statute which does not contain a jurisdictional amount requirement; 92 or
(3) where plaintiffs sue to protect a "common and undivided interest." ,93
86. Id. at 341-42.
87. 414 U.S. 291 (1973).
88. Id. at 301.
89. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3) provides that a class action may be maintained if the court
finds that "questions of law or fact common to the members of the class predominate over
any questions affecting only individual members, and that a class action is superior to
other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy." Id.
90. This is especially true in light of the Court's failure to discuss ancillary jurisdiction
in Zahn. Since the named plaintiffs had claims in excess of $10,000, the Court arguably
could have taken ancillary jurisdiction over the unnamed plaintiffs and their claims. The
majority opinion refrained from mentioning this possibility, even though the dissent
discussed it in depth. 414 U.S. at 305-08 (Brennan, J., dissenting). For a full discussion of
ancillary jurisdiction, see Note, Ancillary Jurisdiction and the Jurisdictional Amount
Requirement, 50 NOTRE DAME LAW. 346 (1974).
91. See note 7 supra.
92. See note 69 supra.
93. Snyder v. Harris, 394 U.S. 332, 335 (1969).
Environmental and consumer class actions apparently do not fit into one of these
exceptions. Since it is rare for plaintiffs in either type of case to have a claim in excess of
$10,000, it is doubtful that these suits will be heard in federal court. See Note, Federal
Procedure: The Class Action-A Social Weapon Disarmed?, 26 U. FLA. L. REV. 642,647
(1974). This is unfortunate, since the class action suit has been considered the most
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The decisions in Snyder and Zahn apparently run counter to the
rationale of the amendment to rule 23. The new rule was enacted "to
eliminate nonfunctional and analytically worthless distinctions embodied
in the old rules and . . . to facilitate class actions under a wider variety
of circumstances." 94 But those distinctions have indeed been maintained
by continued use of the old tests for aggregation, 95 and the unaltered ban
on aggregation has prevented any expanded use of class actions. 96 The
Court has instead considered the purpose of the jurisdictional amount
requirement to be paramount. In refusing to allow aggregation, the Court
believes it is obeying the more important mandates of Congress:
To overrule the aggregation doctrine at this late date would run
counter to the congressional purpose in steadily increasing through
the years the jurisdictional amount requirement. That purpose was
to check, to some degree, the rising caseload of the federal courts,
especially with regard to the federal courts' diversity of citizenship
requirement.
97
However, as discussed earlier, 98 the purpose of the jurisdictional
amount requirement is to prevent federal dockets from being cluttered
with petty controversies. It is not always correct to equate the substantial-
ity of a suit with its monetary value. 99 Although each plaintiff's claim
might be of little monetary value, the total amount of money involved
and the rights violated may be substantial. 100 In addition, some commen-
tators feel that aggregation would not add significantly to the caseload of
federal courts. t0t Therefore, the ban on aggregation does nothing to
effective method of protecting the average citizen attempting to fight a corporate defend-
ant. See Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 391 F.2d 555, 560 (2d Cir. 1968).
94. Goldberg, The Influence of Procedural Rules on Federal Jurisdiction, 28 STAN. L.
REV. 397, 405 (1976).
95. Id. See also note 81 supra.
96. See note 93 supra.
97. Snyder v. Harris, 394 U.S. 332, 339-40 (1969).
98. See notes 5-15 supra and accompanying text.
99. Otherwise, for example, nearly all consumer class actions would be considered
trivial. See note 15 supra and accompanying text.
100. A good example is Gas Serv. Co. v. Coburn, 389 F.2d 831 (10th Cir. 1968), rev'd
sub nom. Snyder v. Harris, 394 U.S. 332 (1969) (Coburn is actually a companion case to
Snyder v. Harris). In Coburn, plaintiffs alleged that the defendant had illegally billed and
collected a city tax from a class of 18,000 plaintiffs. Coburn's own claim was for $7.81, but
the total amount collected by defendant far exceeded $10,000. Considering the number of
plaintiffs and the nature of the violation, this was obviously a substantial suit. In fact one
commentator suggested that "[i]f any suit deserves a federal forum, it is a suit like Snyder
or Coburn." Moore & Wicker, Federal Jurisdiction: A Proposal to Simplify the System to
Meet the Needs of a Complex Society, I FLA. ST. U.L. REV. 1, 13 (1973). But apparently
this is the sort of case which is too trivial for federal courts to consider.
101. Moore & Wicker, Federal Jurisdiction: A Proposal to Simplify the System to Meet
the Needs of a Complex Society, 1 FLA. ST. U.L. REV. 1, 12 (1973); Note, Ancillary
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promote the congressional goals discussed in Snyder.'02 In light of these
factors the Court's stance on aggregation seems unnecessary, and it may
serve to frustrate the purpose behind the amendment to rule 23.103
B. Effect of Aggregation on Defendant's Perspective Rule
In Snyder and Zahn, the Court dealt with class actions seeking
damages. However, these cases also have a significant impact on class
actions seeking injunctive relief. A potential means of avoiding the limits
of the aggregation doctrine is to value the matter in controversy from the
defendant's perspective. Yet all of the lower courts which have confront-
ed this argument have rejected it.104 Their rationale is that " '[tiotal
detriment' [to the defendant] is basically the same as aggregation."1
0 5
The Ninth Circuit, in Snow v. Ford Motor Co. ,"o rejected an argu-
ment that the defendant's perspective rule applies in 23(b)(3) class
actions seeking, in large part, injunctive relief. Alvah Snow had pur-
chased a "trailering special package" from Ford, only to find that the kit
was incomplete, 10 7 contrary to explicit statements made in Ford's adver-
tisements. Snow then brought a class action in a California court, seeking
actual damages of $11.00 (the price of the kit), punitive damages of
$5,000,000, and an injunction to prevent Ford from selling the kit
without the necessary components. Ford then removed the case to federal
court. Snow sought to have the suit remanded to state court for lack of
subject matter jurisdiction. The district court denied Snow's motion by
valuing the amount in controversy from the defendant's perspective. The
court did not examine the amount of money Ford would have to expend
in order to comply with the injunction, but instead valued Ford's "busi-
ness right" 108 to market its products.
The Ninth Circuit rejected the district court's analysis and held that the
right involved was the right asserted by plaintiffs, or "the right of
individual future consumers to be protected from Ford's allegedly decep-
tive advertising which is said to injure them in the amount of $11.00
Jurisdiction and the Jurisdictional Amount Requirement, 50 NOTRE DAME LAW. 346, 349
(1974).
102. See notes 82-86 supra and accompanying text.
103. See note 94 supra and accompanying text.
104. See, e.g., Snow v. Ford Motor Co., 561 F.2d 787 (9th Cir. 1977); Massachusetts
State Pharmaceutical Ass'n v. Federal Prescription Serv., Inc., 431 F.2d 130 (8th Cir.
1970); Lonnquist v. J.C. Penney Co., 421 F.2d 597 (10th Cir. 1970).
105. Snow v. Ford Motor Co., 561 F.2d 787, 790 (9th Cir. 1977).
106. 561 F.2d 787 (9th Cir. 1977).
107. The kit failed to contain a wiring device necessary to connect the electrical system
of plaintiff's automobile to the trailer. Id. at 788.
108. Id. at 790.
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each." 109 Thus, to value the matter in controversy from Ford's viewpoint
would be equivalent to aggregating thousands of $11.00 claims. The
court concluded that where "the equitable relief sought is but a means
through which the individual claims may be satisfied, the ban on aggre-
gation [applies] with equal force to the equitable as well as the monetary
relief."110
The Ninth Circuit has left open the question whether or not a rule
23(b)(1)" or 23(b)(2) 1 2 class action might be valued from the defend-
ant's perspective. 113 Since the rule 23(b)(2) action is used primarily in
civil rights cases," 4 jurisdiction is usually invoked under section 1343115
without regard to monetary value. Suits brought under rule 23(b)(1) tend
to involve "common and undivided" 6 rights. When a class of plaintiffs
sues on a single right, it is still possible to use the defendant's perspective
rule to value the amount in controversy, as the First Circuit did in
Berman v. Narragansett Racing Association. I"
In Berman, plaintiffs were a class of pursewinners, suing to collect
money owed to them as a class by the Racing Association under an
annual purse agreement. The court found that plaintiffs' interests were
common and undivided, since "the amount of individual claims cannot
be determined until the contract issue is settled and a formula [is]
established." 18 Since the court could not determine plaintiffs' individual
shares until the suit had been tried, it necessarily had to value the matter
in controversy from the defendant's perspective (the fund which the
Racing Association would have to pay to the class of pursewinners).
Clearly, the procedure followed in Berman was equivalent to aggregat-
109. Id. at 791.
110. Id. at 790 (quoting Barton Chem. Corp. v. Avis Rent A Car Sys., Inc., 402 F.
Supp. 1195, 1198 (N.D. Ill. 1975)).
111. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(1) provides that a class action may be maintained if
the prosecution of separate actions by or against individual members of the class
would create a risk of (A) inconsistent or varying adjudications. . . or (B) adjudica-
tions. . . which would as a practical matter be dispositive of the interests of the other
members not parties to the adjudications or substantially impair or impede their
ability to protect their interests.
112. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2) provides that a class action may be maintained if "the
party opposing the class has acted or refused to act on grounds generally applicable to the
class, thereby making appropriate final injunctive relief. . . to the class as a whole."
113. 561 F.2d at 790 n.4.
114. Advisory Committee's Note, Proposed Rules of Civil Procedure, 39 F.R.D. 69,
102 (1966).
115. 28 U.S.C. § 1343 (1970 & Supp. V 1975).
116. Advisory Committee's Note, Proposed Rules of Civil Procedure, 39 F.R.D. 69, 98
(1966).
117. 414 F.2d 311 (1st Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1037 (1970).
118. Id. at 316.
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ing plaintiffs' claims. However, the court did not view this as aggrega-
tion, but as an application of the defendant's perspective method of
valuation. The district court had "found that since no single plaintiff has
a contractual right to a portion of the withheld money, there was no
definable amount or matter in controversy."' 1 9 Under the district court's
analysis, aggregation was improper because the individual claims could
not be valued in monetary terms. Apparently the court felt that plaintiffs'
claim to the entire fund was not sufficient; plaintiffs would also have to
value the individual portions they sought to aggregate. Arguably this
would defeat the action, since defendant would be in a position to claim
that plaintiffs' rights were not "common and undivided," but were
"separate and distinct."' 20 The First Circuit circumvented this result by
applying the normal criterion established by the defendant's perspective
rule: "the test for determining the amount in controversy is the pecuniary
result to either party which the judgment would directly produce."121
For rule 23(b)(2) 22 class actions not covered by section 1343,123 it is
possible that the defendant's perspective rule might be used to meet the
jurisdictional amount requirement. 24 However, the Ninth Circuit has
made its position clear: before the question of aggregation may be
approached, "the amount in controversy must . . . be capable of
measurement in terms of pecuniary value." 25 In class actions requesting
only injunctive relief (rule 23(b)(2) actions) this can sometimes cause
difficulties. In Jackson v. American Bar Association,t26 the plaintiff
class consisted of 2,600 law students attending schools not accredited by
the ABA. The ABA granted these students a status different from that
held by students attending accredited schools. The plaintiffs sought only
an injunction to remove this distinction. They sought to gain the rights
and privileges held by the students attending accredited schools, includ-
ing the right to run for office in the student division of the ABA. The
court decided that it could not define these rights in monetary terms, and
therefore could not grant jurisdiction.
In conclusion, the lower courts' interpretations of Snyder and Zahn
119. Id. at 314.
120. Snyder v. Harris, 394 U.S. 332, 335 (1969).
121. 414 F.2d at 314 (quoting Ronzio v. Denver & R.G.W.R.R., 116 F.2d 604, 606 (10th
Cir. 1940)).
122. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2). See note 112 supra.
123. 28 U.S.C. § 1343 (1970 & Supp. V 1975).
124. See notes 131-41 infra and accompanying text. Note however that the case
discussed-Committee for GI Rights v. Calla way-involves constitutional rights.
125. Jackson v. American Bar Ass'n, 538 F.2d 829, 832 (9th Cir. 1976).
126. 538 F.2d 829 (9th Cir. 1976).
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have indicated that to use the defendants' perspective rule in class actions
is just another method of aggregating plaintiffs' claims and may not be
used in a rule 23(b)(3) action. It is still possible that the defendant's
perspective rule may be considered in a 23(b)(1) action, or in those
23(b)(2) actions not governed by section 1343.127 The Ninth Circuit has
not indicated what course it will follow. It is probable that the court will
follow the First Circuit's example in Berman, if the rights of the 23(b)(1)
action are "common and undivided. ' 128 This approach is explicitly
permitted by Snyder. It is also possible that the defendant's perspective
rule may be used in 23(b)(2) actions, as long as the interests involved can
be valued in monetary terms.
C. Valuing Constitutional Rights in Class Action Suits
As a result of the amendment to section 1331,129 an entire class of
cases involving constitutional rights no longer has to meet the specific
monetary barrier provided in that section. However, the jurisdictional
amount requirement must still be met when the defendant is a municipal
corporation, a county or a school board. 30 Because these cases still arise
under section 1331, it is relevant to examine the method which courts
will employ to value the matter in controversy in a class action where
plaintiffs allege a constitutional violation.
The most significant post-Snyder decision involving a constitutional
claim in a class action setting is Committee for GIRights v. Callaway. 3'
Plaintiffs, soldiers stationed in Europe, were subjected to an Army drug
abuse program. Under this program, any suspected drug abuser was
publicly identified as such, had his driver's license and passes suspend-
ed, and had his civilian clothing confiscated. Plaintiffs sought to enjoin
the Army from continuing to harass the soldiers by bringing a rule
23(b)(2) class action.
The court took the usual approach to the problem of valuing constitu-
tional claims, and held that although such claims are difficult to measure,
"that difficulty does not make the claim non-justiciable under Section
1331(a)."' 32 The court went on to provide a means of meeting the
jurisdictional amount requirement-by adopting the defendant's perspec-
tive rule. If the court considered the cost to the Army of terminating or
127. 28 U.S.C. § 1343 (1970 & Supp. V 1975).
128. Snyder v. Harris, 394 U.S. 332, 335 (1969).
129. See note 67 supra.
130. See note 74 supra.
131. 518 F.2d 466 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
132. Id. at 472 (quoting Gomez v. Wilson, 477 F.2d 411, 420 n.51 (D.C. Cir. 1973)).
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altering the program, plaintiffs' claim far exceeded $10,000.133
The court's application of the defendant's perspective rule is signifi-
cant in light of Snyder v. Harris and its aftermath. The Ninth Circuit
found in Snow v. Ford Motor Co. 134 that application of the defendant's
perspective rule was merely an attempt to evade Snyder's prohibition
against the aggregation of claims. It also found that every lower court
which examined this question in a 23(b)(3) class action setting had
refused to apply that rule. 135 The Snow court referred to Callaway, but
distinguished it on the grounds that it was a rule 23(b)(2) class action.
Even though Snow involved a 23(b)(3) action, the suit asked mainly for
injunctive relief, and the court considered only the injunction in attempt-
ing to value the amount in controversy. Thus, the procedural distinction
between Snow and Callaway did not merit the contrary conclusions
reached in those cases. The only important distinction to be made is
between "common and undivided" rights and "separate and distinct"
rights-the former may be aggregated and the latter may not. 136 The
court in Callaway did not attempt to make such a distinction, but instead
held that "the jurisdictional amount is . . .satisfied with respect to all of
the plaintiffs because of the costs that the army would incur if the
plaintiffs prevailed.' 1 37 In other words, that court avoided the issue of
aggregation simply by applying the defendant's perspective rule to every
plaintiff. This is exactly what the Ninth Circuit in Snow held to be
impermissible. 1
38
The only real difference between Snow and Callaway is that the
former involved business rights while the latter involved constitutional
rights. Callaway simply followed a line of cases treating constitutional
rights more liberally than other rights. 139 The court was reluctant to
dismiss the suit for failure to meet the jurisdictional amount requirement,
133. The court assessed the value of the claim as follows:
The cost to the Army . . .would be the cost of (1) stopping the drug inspections
entirely or providing a warrant procedure for inspections; (2) providing a hearing prior
to the imposition of administrative measures; [and] (3) eliminating other challenged
aspects of the drug program. . . .Considering both the prospective tangible cost of
additional hearings and intangible cost of drug abuse among personnel as the result of
an adverse ruling, we agree ... that the cost to defendants might well exceed
$10,000.
518 F.2d at 473.
134. 561 F.2d 787 (9th Cir. 1977).
135. Id. at 789-90.
136. Snyder v. Harris, 394 U.S. 332, 335 (1969).
137. 518 F.2d at 473.
138. 561 F.2d at 790.
139. See notes 54-55 supra and accompanying text.
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especially since "[t]he constitutional issues raised by the plaintiffs [were]
not frivolous.""
In light of Snow, it is unlikely that the Ninth Circuit will adopt the
Callaway approach. Snow unequivocally held that the defendant's per-
spective rule could not be used in a rule 23(b)(3) class action. Although
the court explicitly refused to extend this prohibition to rule 23(b)(2)
actions, it seems improbable that this formal distinction would cause a
different result in a rule 23(b)(3) action where injunctive relief is sought.
Snow recognized that aggregation is permissible only if the rights in-
volved are "common and undivided."' 41 To permit aggregation (or use
of the defendant's perspective rule as a means of accomplishing the same
purpose), the Ninth Circuit will have to find that constitutional rights are
common and undivided, regardless of which section of rule 23 is invoked
by the plaintiffs.
IV. CONCLUSION
The jurisdictional amount requirement equates the substantiality of the
matter in controversy with its monetary worth. This approach is inap-
propriate in certain instances where, for example, the claims presented
involve intangible or constitutional rights. A strict application of the
jurisdictional amount requirement would keep these claims out of federal
court. Clearly, the better view is to permit valuation from the defendant's
perspective as well as the plaintiff's. By considering the impact of the
claim on either party, the court may still obey Congress' mandate to keep
petty controversies out of federal court; yet there is a greater opportunity
for all substantial claims to be heard. Use of the defendant's perspective
rule still equates the substantiality of an action with its monetary worth,
but its effect is less harsh.
Karen L. Williams
140. 518 F.2d at 473.
141. 561 F.2d at 790.
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